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This paper shows that securitization reduces the influence of bank financial condition on loan supply.
Low-cost funding and increased balance-sheet liquidity raise bank willingness to approve mortgages
that are hard to sell (jumbo mortgages), while having no effect on their willingness to approve
mortgages easy to sell (non-jumbos).  Thus, the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market
fostered by securitization has reduced the impact of local funding shocks on credit supply.  By
extension, securitization has weakened the link from bank funding conditions to credit supply in
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Liquidity transformation – funding illiquid loans with liquid deposits – has been viewed 
as a fundamental role for banks.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that banks improve welfare 
by allowing depositors to diversify liquidity risk while investing in high-return, illiquid projects.  
Securitization has changed the way banks provide liquidity.  Today, while real projects remain 
illiquid, loans have become more liquid because banks often securitize them, thereby replacing 
deposits with bonds as the primary source of finance.  Securitization has grown fastest in 
mortgage markets because the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs, i.e. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) enhance mortgage-loan liquidity.
1  By regulation, however, the GSEs only buy 
mortgages below a given size threshold (the jumbo-loan cutoff).  Mortgages below this threshold 
are more liquid than those above the threshold.  This paper shows that bank financial condition, 
while continuing to affect bank acceptance rates on illiquid loans (jumbos), has no effect on 
acceptance rates on liquid loans (non-jumbos).  Thus, securitization has reduced the impact of 
bank financial condition on credit supply. 
We study mortgages because their liquidity falls sharply around the jumbo-loan cutoff.  
Such a discrete and exogenous drop in liquidity is difficult to find elsewhere.
2  To exploit this 
special feature of the U.S. mortgage market, we first regress the difference in acceptance rates 
for non-jumbo and jumbo mortgages on bank financial variables and other controls.  By 
comparing relative acceptance rates in our regressions, we ‘difference out’ unobservable but 
potentially confounding demand-side factors.  The results suggest that this acceptance-rate 
difference widens at financially constrained banks.  
2
We further show that while acceptance rates depend on financial condition for jumbo 
mortgages, acceptance rates for non-jumbos do not vary with the originating bank’s financial 
position because these loans can be easily sold.  Thus, loan liquidity seems to eliminate the link 
from a bank’s financial condition to its willingness to supply credit.  Mortgage liquidity has 
increased rapidly over the past 30 years, in part through GSE subsidies.  Private-sector financial 
institutions, however, have also increased loan liquidity in other sectors by securitizing consumer 
and business loans.  Our results therefore extend into these other markets as well. 
Figure 1 illustrates our main findings.  Panel A compares the aggregate probability of 
accepting mortgages originated by banks in the top quartile of the funding-cost distribution with 
those in the bottom quartile of this distribution, where funding costs equal the ratio of a bank’s 
total interest expenses on deposits to total deposits.  The figure suggests that banks with high 
funding costs are reluctant to approve jumbo mortgages, relative to competing banks with low 
funding costs.  On average, the acceptance rate for jumbo mortgages rises from 88.4 percent for 
high-cost banks to 91.1 percent for low-cost banks.  In contrast, the acceptance rate for non-
jumbo mortgages barely reflects the originating bank’s funding costs at all.
3  This difference 
makes sense because banks usually fund accepted jumbo mortgages with deposits.  In contrast, 
banks have the option to sell non-jumbo mortgages to the GSEs, thus avoiding the need to 
finance them.  Panel B reports a similar set of results but focuses on balance-sheet liquidity, 
defined as the ratio of marketable securities and federal funds sold to assets.  Like funding costs, 
bank liquidity seems to matter less for non-jumbo mortgages (because the bank holds the option 
to sell the loan) than for jumbos (because the bank must hold the loan). 
Funding costs and liquidity may also affect the characteristics of a bank’s flow of 
mortgage applications.  For example, loan-application size may be endogenous if funding- 
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constrained banks encourage some customers to reduce their borrowing below the jumbo-loan 
cutoff, either by offering pricing incentives or by threatening to reject the loan.  Panel C of 
Figure 1 tests this idea using marginal loan applications, defined as those within 5 percent of the 
jumbo-loan cutoff (i.e. between 95 percent and 105 percent of the cutoff).  The flow of these 
marginal applications is related both to bank cost of funds and liquidity.  We find that banks with 
high funding costs or low levels of liquidity receive a larger share of non-jumbo mortgage 
applications, relative to other banks.  Thus, banks better positioned to originate and hold illiquid 
loans – banks with low cost of deposits and/or a large buffer of liquid assets – supply more of 
these loans.  These banks are more willing to approve jumbo loans, and they receive a greater 
flow of jumbo-loan applications. 
This paper contributes to several strands of research at the intersection of finance and 
macroeconomics.  First, the results suggest that propagation of local business cycles across 
regions is less pronounced today than in the past, due in part to the developing depth of the 
mortgage secondary markets.  In contrast to the jumbo-loan market, we find no link between a 
bank’s funding or liquidity and its propensity to supply non-jumbo mortgages.  Hence, there is 
no reason to expect that a reduction in local banking capacity will affect most mortgage 
borrowers.  This result matters quantitatively because more than 90 percent of mortgage 
applications fall below the jumbo-loan cutoff, and because shocks to the local financial system 
can potentially worsen business downturns.
4  Integration of the banking system has reduced the 
effect of these local shocks by allowing capital to flow more freely through the banking system 
(Ashcraft (2003), Houston, James and Marcus (1997), Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), 
Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen (2005)).  The growth of mortgage secondary markets is 
one means by which the financial system has become better integrated over time.  Other  
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dimensions of integration include expansion of bank branching, cross-state bank consolidation 
and loan syndication. 
Second, consistent with Estrella (2002) and Loutskina (2005), expansion of the secondary 
market in mortgages has likely dampened the effects of monetary policy on real economic 
activity.  According to the ‘bank lending’ channel of monetary policy, central banks can slow 
real activity by raising bank funding costs (e.g. the cost of deposits) and thereby constrain the 
supply of credit.  Our results suggest that there is no link between bank funding costs and credit 
supplied to the non-jumbo mortgage market.  Hence, the lending channel to borrowers in this 
market has been mitigated by the growth of securitization.
5  Together with studies on the 
increasing size and geographical scope of banks, our results thus suggest that the overall potency 
of monetary policy ought to be reduced relative to earlier times when banks were smaller, less 
well integrated with other banks, and less able to sell their loans into secondary markets.
6 
Finally, our results shed more light on how non-financial firms’ cost of capital depends 
on their bank’s financial condition.
7  Most of the extant research has tested for effects of 
monetary policy or bank solvency (capital) shocks on credit supply to bank-dependent firms.
8 
Our results indicate that securitization increases banks’ willingness to supply credit to all (even 
illiquid) sectors, but that high costs of deposits or limited balance-sheet liquidity only affect the 
supply of illiquid loans (jumbo mortgages here, although the result likely generalizes to other 
illiquid lending such as small business credit).  Like the earlier literature, we also find some 
evidence that bank solvency affects credit supply -- better capitalized banks receive a larger flow 
of jumbo applications than less capitalized ones.  However, we find no direct link from bank 
capital to mortgage acceptance rates.  
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II.   THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 
A. The Growth of Securitization 
Credit markets have been reshaped by the growth of trading in secondary markets.  Banks 
traditionally originated and held loans on their balance sheets, and thus credit availability 
depended in part on the cost and availability of funds to banks.  Over the past quarter century, 
however, loan securitization has reshaped lending markets.  Securitization typically involves 
pooling the cash flows from a number of similar assets (e.g. mortgages or credit card accounts) 
and selling the pool to a separate legal entity known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The 
pooling process results in a diversified portfolio of cash flows, which are used to support 
payments on debt securities issued by the SPV.  Often, the cash flows come with some additional 
implicit or explicit guarantees from the originating financial institution (or the originator retains 
the residual or equity tranche in the SPV).  Creating this separate SPV isolates the cash-flow 
generating assets and/or collateral so that securities issued by the SPV are not a general claim 
against the issuer, just against those assets.  Cash flows from the original pool of loans can be 
further stripped and repackaged based on various characteristics (e.g., the prepayment behavior 
or payment priority) to enhance their liquidity.
9 
Table 1 illustrates the growing quantitative significance of loan securitization for 
different types of loans over time.  The Table presents the amount of loans outstanding and  
securitized for six loan categories between 1976 and 2003.  Consider, for example, home 
mortgages:  In 1976, the amount of securitized home mortgages was $28 billion; by the end of 
2003 the total amount of securitized home mortgages had grown almost 150 times, reaching 
$4.2 trillion.  Over the same period, the amount of home mortgages outstanding grew almost 15  
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times, from $489 billion to $7.3 trillion.  Mortgage securitization has grown 10 times as fast as 
the market itself! 
Securitization has also made inroads in the financing of other kinds of loans, albeit less 
dramatically.  In 1976 there was no securitization of commercial mortgages, business loans 
(commercial and industrial, or C&I, loans) or consumer loans.  By the end of 2003, $294 billion 
of commercial mortgages were securitized, $104 billion worth of C&I loans were securitized, 
along with $658 billion worth of consumer loans.  Figure 2 illustrates these trends graphically. 
To understand why securitization of mortgages has taken off so dramatically, one needs 
to appreciate the role of The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).  These two so-called Government-
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) were created by the U.S. Congress to provide stability and 
liquidity to the market for residential mortgages, and to promote access to mortgage credit and 
home ownership.  Together, they have played the dominant role in fostering the development of 
the secondary market.  Starting in the 1970s, the GSEs began to purchase mortgages from banks, 
savings institutions and other mortgage originators.  As shown by Frame and White (2005), the 
GSEs have played an increasingly important part in mortgage markets since the early 1980s.  For 
example, by 1990 about 25 percent of the $2.9 trillion in outstanding mortgages were either 
purchased and held or purchased and securitized by the two major GSEs.  By 2003, this market 
share had increased to 47 percent.  In other words, today approximately half of all mortgages 
outstanding were sold to the GSEs after origination (neither Fannie nor Freddie is permitted to 
originate mortgages themselves). 
The GSEs enhance mortgage liquidity either by buying and holding mortgages or by 
securitizing them.  When the GSEs buy mortgages, they bear both credit and interest rate risk.   
7
When GSEs securitize mortgages, they either buy them and issue mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), or they just sell credit protection to the original lender.  In the first case, the originating 
bank retains no stake in the mortgage.  In the second case, the bank continues to fund the 
mortgage and bear the interest rate risk, but obtains the option to sell it off as an MBS.  In all 
cases, the GSEs enhance liquidity.
10 
Most important, the GSE charters limit the size of mortgages that they may purchase or 
securitize.  For example, in 2005 the GSEs could only purchase ‘non-jumbo’ mortgages, those 
below $359,650.
11  This cutoff is set annually based on a housing price index.  Thus, there is a 
discrete drop in mortgage liquidity around the jumbo-loan cutoff that is exogenous to financial 
intermediary decisions. 
B. Mortgage Market Segmentation 
The GSE charter limitation conveniently splits the market into a liquid segment (non-
jumbo mortgages) and an illiquid segment (jumbo mortgages).  How do we know that liquidity 
really falls at the cutoff?  Perhaps the private sector steps in and seamlessly facilitates mortgage 
securitization in the jumbo market.  First, in contrast to jumbos, most non-jumbo mortgages can 
be sold by the original lender.  Second, the GSEs are the only financial institution that will buy 
individual mortgage loans.  Thus, securitization of non-jumbos would be especially costly for 
small banks without the GSEs.  Third, mortgage-backed securities issued by GSEs come with 
required capital only one-fourth as large as required capital for similar securities (such as jumbo-
mortgage securitizations) issued by private financial institutions under the Basel Capital Accord.  
Fourth, there is a sharp increase in the frequency of mortgage applications just below the jumbo-
loan cutoff, suggesting that the GSE withdrawal from the jumbo market increases the cost of 
borrowing.  And, more directly, the pricing of mortgages changes around the jumbo-loan cutoff.   
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Yields on non-jumbo loans are on the order of 20 basis points lower than the yields on jumbos 
(e.g. Mckenzie (2002) provides a survey of this literature).  If liquidity fell gradually with 
mortgage size, yields would rise smoothly with size.  Instead, yields jump discretely around the 
jumbo-loan cutoff.  Moreover, this yield differential has been relatively stable over time (Figure 
3).
12 
The jumbo/non-jumbo spread would seem to offer a natural measure of the value of 
liquidity from the GSEs.  Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) present a model in which this 
spread rises with bank funding costs, and they use aggregate data to show that this spread 
increases as the availability of core deposits declines.  There are no empirical studies testing how 
the jumbo/non-jumbo spread varies across lenders because pricing information by lender is not 
available.  Our approach differs from the extant studies of pricing.  We focus on the quantity side 
of the market, where loan applications can be linked to the originating bank, and test how 
approval rates vary across banks. 
We test whether a lender’s willingness to approve a jumbo mortgage is affected by its 
financing conditions.  Funding costs should not affect a bank’s willingness to make a non-jumbo 
loan – the loan can be sold to one of the GSEs.  Funding costs, however, should affect a bank’s 
willingness to approve jumbo mortgages, since the bank has to hold and hence fund these loans.  
Similarly, banks with relatively low holdings of liquid assets may be reluctant to approve illiquid 
jumbo loans because they are difficult to sell, while liquidity concerns should not affect approval 
rates for non-jumbo mortgages that banks can choose either to sell or to hold.  Our main tests 
focus on the willingness of banks to approve jumbo mortgages, relative to non-jumbo mortgages, 
as a function of the bank’s funding costs and balance-sheet liquidity.  
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III. DATA & SAMPLE SELECTION 
A. Sample of Mortgage Applications 
To build our dataset, we start with a comprehensive sample of mortgage applications and 
originations that have been collected by the Federal Reserve since 1992 under provisions of the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).  The sample covers loan applications from 1992 to 
2003.  HMDA was passed into law by Congress in 1975 and expanded in 1988, with the purpose 
of informing the public (and the regulators) about whether or not financial institutions adequately 
serve local credit needs.  In addition, regulators use the HMDA data to help identify 
discriminatory lending.  These data are collected by the Federal Reserve under Regulation C, and 
all regulated financial institutions (e.g. commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions, and 
mortgage companies) with assets above $30 million must report. 
The HMDA data include information on the year of the application (although we know 
nothing about exactly when during a given year a loan application was made), the dollar amount 
of the loan, and whether or not the loan was accepted.  The dataset also has information on the 
identity of the lender, which we use to measure the funding and liquidity variables described 
below.  To control for loan risk, we can observe the location of the property, the sex and race of 
the applicant, and the level of the applicant’s income as well as the income-to-loan-size ratio.  To 
control for economic conditions near the property, we know whether or not the property is 
located within an urban Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the share of the population that is 
minority in the property’s Census Tract, and the median income in that Census Tract.  We will 
control for all of these factors in our models to absorb variation in the risk characteristics of loan 
applicants.  There is unfortunately no information on the market value of the property in the 
HMDA data.  
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Figure 4 plots a histogram of the frequency distribution of mortgage applications from 
HMDA data over the 1992-2003 period (on the order of 106 million loan applications), as a 
function of the ratio of loan size to the jumbo-loan cutoff (Panel A).
13  The figure shows first that 
most mortgage applications come in below the cutoff value (i.e. most mortgages can be sold 
easily into the secondary market).  Also, we see a sharp spike in the frequency of loan 
applications just below the cutoff.  This spike suggests that the applicant pool itself is 
endogenously determined, at least in part, by financial conditions.  That is, we know that interest 
rates are higher for jumbo loans, thus some applicants with loan demand “near” the jumbo-loan 
cutoff may borrow less than they otherwise would to take advantage of the lower rate.  
Panel B of Figure 4 reports the average acceptance rate for mortgages, again as a function 
of the ratio of the loan amount to the jumbo-loan cutoff.  As in Panel A, we see a sharp upward 
spike in the acceptance rate for loans just below the cutoff.  The high acceptance rate just below 
the cutoff suggests that some of the most creditworthy clients borrow less than the cutoff, either 
to take advantage of lower rates or because the lender would not approve a jumbo loan for these 
clients.  (We address this loan-application size endogeneity in Sections V.B-V.D.)  The figure 
also shows that acceptance rates appear to fall off sharply for very small loans, and the 
acceptance rate also falls off gradually as loan size increases beyond the jumbo-loan cutoff.  The 
very small loans may be riskier due to the low income and wealth of the applicants, while the 
very large loans may be riskier due to unusually high demand for credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1982). 
B. Bank Financial Variables 
To understand how funding costs and liquidity affect the supply of mortgage credit, we 
collect bank-level data by merging the HMDA loan application data to the Reports of Income  
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and Condition for commercial banks (the ‘Call Report’).  We merge each application to the Call 
Report from the fourth quarter of the year of the mortgage application using the HMDA bank 
identification number with call report identification number (RSSD ID) for banks reporting to 
Federal Reserve Bank, with FDIC certificate ID (item RSSD9050 in Call report) for banks 
reporting to FDIC, and with OCC ID (item RSSD9055 in Call report) for banks reporting to 
OCC.  The unmatched institutions from HMDA dataset are then matched manually using a 
bank’s name and the zip code of its location. 
Using Call Report data, we focus our attention on the cost of deposits to the lender 
(measured by the ratio of total interest expenses on deposits to total deposits), and on the lender’s 
balance sheet liquidity (the ratio of cash plus securities to total assets).  We also control for 
lender size (log of total assets), leverage (the ratio of capital to assets) and profitability (net 
income to total assets).  Last, we supplement the traditional measure of balance sheet liquidity 
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The economy-wide data on securitization and loans outstanding come from the U.S. Flow 
of Funds, while the bank-level data come from the Call Report.  This index can be thought of as 
a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type (based on economy-wide 
averages – the first term in parentheses), where the weights reflect each bank’s individual loan 
portfolio (the second term in parentheses).  Thus, market trends generate time variation in the 
index (recall Figure 2), whereas differences in bank loan portfolios generate variation across 
institutions.  To construct this measure, we break the loan portfolio into six categories: (i) home  
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mortgages; (ii) multifamily residential mortgages, (iii) commercial mortgages, (iv) consumer 
credit, (v) business loans not secured by real estate (commercial and industrial loans), and (vi) 
farm mortgages. 
The raw HMDA data contain almost 250 million mortgage applications.  Of these, we 
first drop those originated by savings institutions, mortgage bankers, credit unions and other non-
bank lenders, leaving about 120 million mortgage applications to financial institutions reporting 
to FDIC, FRB, and OCC (mostly commercial banks).  We then drop mortgages where borrowers 
are subsidized by the Federal Housing Authority, the Veterans Administration or other 
government programs, leaving us with about 106 million loan applications.  Of these, we keep 
loans for home purchase only, which reduces the sample to around 35 million (more than half of 
the loan applications are for mortgage refinancing).  We drop cases where a loan application was 
incomplete or withdrawn – that is, we only keep loan applications where we can determine 
whether or not the lender approved or denied the application.  To be sure our sample is relatively 
homogeneous (recall Figure 4 above), we keep only those loans between 50 percent and 250 
percent of the jumbo-mortgage cutoff, which reduces the sample to about 8.6 million 
applications.  We then take this sample of loans and merge the observation to the Bank Call 
Report.  This merge leaves us with a final sample of 6,143,057 loan applications. 
Since we are only using about three percent of all mortgage applications, one might 
legitimately question the generality of the results.  To address this concern, we report the 
frequency distribution and acceptance rates for mortgages between 50 percent and 250 percent of 
the jumbo-loan cutoff for both our sample, and for the full sample of applications in HMDA.  As 
shown in Figure 5, both the frequency and acceptance rates look very similar for the two 
samples, suggesting that our data filters have not created a biased or unusual selection of  
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mortgage applications.  For example, we see in both samples a similar large upward spike in the 
number of applications and a jump in the acceptance rate just below the jumbo-loan cutoff.  We 
also see the same fall off in the acceptance rate as the size of the mortgages falls, and as 
mortgage size increases beyond the cutoff. 
Table 2 contains simple summary statistics for the mortgage application data that we use 
in our regression sample, and for selected years between 1992 and 2003.  We report the 
acceptance rate, loan size, applicant income, and the share of loans made in urban areas (i.e. in 
MSAs).  Of the six million applications, about 91 percent are accepted.  The average loan size is 
$209 thousand, and the mean ratio of loan size to applicant income is 2.4.  About 14 percent of 
the loan applicants are to minority borrowers, and about 15 percent are to female borrowers.  In 
terms of neighborhood attributes, 92 percent of the loan applications are for properties located in 
MSAs.  The median census tract income (averaged across tracts) is $51 thousand per year.
14  
Table 2 also shows that most of these characteristics are quite stable over time, although the 
jumbo-loan cutoff increases as housing prices have risen throughout the sample. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the potential-lender (bank) characteristics included 
in our sample (Panel A).  We also report these characteristics for those banks that are excluded 
from our tests, either because they did not appear in the HMDA dataset, or because we were 
unable to match their identifier to HMDA (Panel B).  The median bank in our sample holds 
about $85 million in assets, and the median bank received 16 mortgage applications (15 
accepted) in a typical year in the sample.  This number of applications may appear small, but 
note that the median bank is small, and that we only consider loans near the jumbo-loan cutoff.  
In fact, 88 percent of loan applications are smaller than 50 percent of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  The 
median deposit cost, defined as interest expenses on deposits divided by total deposits, equals  
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about 3.3 percent, and the median bank held about 28 percent of its assets in either cash or other 
marketable securities.  Our measure of loan liquidity, which again takes account of both a bank’s 
portfolio choices and the depth of the market for securitization in aggregate, was about 23 
percent.  This variable trends upward throughout our sample period as the securitization market 
has expanded.  In contrast, the banks excluded tend to be smaller, less focused on lending, and 
less focused on mortgage lending in particular, although no less profitable.  This is reasonable to 
expect since the HMDA data cover mortgage lenders with total assets in excess of $30 million. 
IV.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
A. Identification 
The fundamental question that we ask here is:  how do funding conditions and liquidity 
affect an individual bank’s willingness to supply credit?  Answering the question convincingly 
creates the challenge of separating the effects of loan demand from those of loan supply.  To 
understand this identification problem, consider the correlation between loan growth and a 
bank’s cost of raising deposits.  If availability of local deposits affects loan supply, then an 
increase in a bank’s cost of deposits ought to be associated with a decline in loan growth.  Strong 
loan demand, however, will tend to increase a bank’s appetite for deposits to fund that demand, 
thus potentially leading to higher yields on deposits (and thus a positive correlation between 
deposit yields and loan growth).  Similarly, a bank’s willingness to hold liquid assets – for 
example, cash or other marketable securities – may be directly affected by loan demand.  Where 
loan demand is weak, we would expect banks to hold more securities.  Thus, demand-side forces 
will tend to generate a negative correlation between measures of bank liquidity and loan growth.  
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Our research method is designed specifically to address these identification problems.  
The first advantage of our approach is that we focus on the acceptance rate for mortgages, rather 
than originations.  Demand conditions will have first-order effects on the flow of loan 
applications, but will not directly influence a bank’s decision to accept a loan.  Thus, we link a 
bank’s funding cost (the yield on deposits) and balance-sheet liquidity (the ratio of cash plus 
securities to assets) to its willingness to approve mortgages, conditional on all observable 
dimensions of loan risk. 
Modeling the acceptance rate helps but does necessarily fully resolve the identification 
problem.  Loan demand may have indirect effects on a bank’s acceptance rate by altering the 
credit quality of the pool of applicants.  For example, when demand is very strong, the loan-to-
value ratio for the typical mortgage application may be above average (due to high housing 
prices relative to buyers’ access to equity).  Because we are not able to observe property values 
in our data set, this demand-driven change in the applicant pool could bias our results toward 
finding a negative (positive) link from deposit yields (liquidity) to a bank’s acceptance rate.  
Rather than model the overall acceptance rate, we instead focus initially on whether the 
acceptance rate of jumbo mortgages – mortgages that the bank must hold and therefore fund – 
reflects funding conditions and liquidity relative to a bank’s acceptance rate for non-jumbo 
mortgages – those that the bank can readily sell into the secondary market.  So, in our benchmark 
tests, we regress the differential acceptance rate, defined as a bank’s average acceptance rate for 
non-jumbo mortgages minus its acceptance rate for jumbos, on the bank’s funding costs, 
traditional bank balance-sheet liquidity, and bank loan liquidity measure.  We assume that 
unobserved demand-side variables affect the acceptance rates of jumbo and non-jumbo 
mortgages at a given bank in the same way.  The identification strategy requires a relatively  
16
homogenous pool of loans around jumbo-loan cutoff, so we drop all loan applications below 50 
percent of the jumbo-loan cutoff and above 250 percent of the cutoff.
15 
B. Estimation 
To understand our estimation, consider two reduced form equations relating the 
acceptance rates to market-level demand-side variables and to bank-level funding characteristics 
(supply-side variables), as follows: 
AR
NJ
i,t   = γ
NJ
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2Deposit costi,t-1 + γ
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where the unit of observation in these regressions is the bank-year.  Subscript i indicates bank, 
and subscript t indicates year.  For each bank-year, the dependent variable equals the acceptance 
rate for non-jumbo mortgages (AR
NJ
i,t  = the share of mortgage applications below the jumbo-
loan cutoff accepted by bank i in year t), or the acceptance rate for jumbo mortgages (AR
J
i,t, 
defined similarly to AR
NJ
i,t for jumbos).  Each equation contains demand-side variables that are 
unobservable, as well as variables reflecting the funding and liquidity position of the potential 
lender.  We expect that banks with more balance-sheet liquidity will be more willing to supply 
illiquid jumbo mortgages than banks that are liquidity constrained.  In contrast, liquidity 
constraints should not affect a bank’s willingness to supply non-jumbo mortgages because these 
can be converted to mortgage-backed securities (which are liquid), or they can be sold off easily  
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(to one of the GSEs).  For funding costs, we expect banks with high deposit costs to reduce loan 
supply more for illiquid jumbo mortgages than for liquid non-jumbos, again because the bank 
must hold and thus fund the illiquid ones (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Campello, 2002).  That is, 
we expect the following relationships to hold: 
0 <= γ
NJ
1 <   γ
J
1   and     0 >= γ
NJ
2 >   γ
J
2. 
If demand-side effects are common across equations (1a) and (1b), then they can be eliminated 
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1, etc.  Thus, we can remove the potentially biasing demand-side effects, but 
we are only able to identify the difference in the coefficients in equations (1a) and (1b).  
Equation (1c) represents our benchmark regression. 
Balance sheet liquidity and the cost of holding deposits, our main variables of interest, 
are defined above.  We also include loan liquidity in the regressions, which may affect the 
differential acceptance rate either positively or negatively.  On the one hand, loan liquidity per se 
ought to increase a bank’s willingness to make illiquid loans for the same reason that the more 
standard measure of balance sheet liquidity does.  On the other hand, banks holding very high 
levels of mortgages (and hence having a relatively liquid loan portfolio), may be motivated to 
originate non-jumbo mortgages that can easily be removed from the balance sheet.
16  The 
increasing depth of the securitization market (illustrated in Figure 2), which tends to increase our 
measure of loan liquidity over time, may also encourage banks to set a lower acceptance hurdle  
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for non-jumbo relative to jumbo mortgages.  Thus, we include loan liquidity as a control 
variable, although as it turns out the main results are not sensitive to the inclusion of this 
variable. 
To control for risk characteristics of the pool of loans used to build the dependent 
variable, we include the following: the ratio of the loan size to applicant income; the log of 
applicant income; the share of properties located in MSAs; the percent minority in the population 
around the property; the median income in the area around the property; and shares of female 
and minority loan applicants.  We construct these characteristics by averaging across all of the 
non-jumbo loans (Borrower Risk
NJ
i,t) and across all of the jumbo loans (Borrower Risk
J
i,t).  We 
allow the coefficients on these risk characteristics to differ by loan type.
17  In addition to loan 
pool characteristics, we include bank size (log of assets), a measure of leverage (the capital-asset 
ratio), and accounting profits (net income to assets).  Because there may be additional 
unobserved bank effects, we cluster the error in the model by bank in constructing standard 
errors.
18 
Changes in the stance of monetary policy could in principle be included in our model to 
test how aggregate funding shocks (e.g. an increase in the Fed Funds rate) affect the supply of 
liquid v. illiquid loans.  Loutskina (2005) finds, for example, that banks with balance sheets 
dominated by liquid mortgages tend to be less affected by changes in monetary policy than other 
banks.  Unfortunately, the HMDA loan application data are not ‘time stamped’.  All we can 
observe is the year in which a given application is made.  Since Federal Reserve policy can 
change sharply over the course of a single year, we simply absorb year effects with a set of 
indicator variables.  We also incorporate state indicator variables in all of our models.  
According to Passmore, et al (2005), removing state effects is important, both because of  
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differences in foreclosure laws across states, and because the jumbo-mortgage market is much 
better developed in states with relatively high housing costs, compared to states with lower-
priced houses. 
V.  RESULTS 
A. Benchmark Regressions 
Table 4 reports the benchmark results. We estimate the regression specification (1c) on 
the sample of bank-years in which the total number of applicants for each type (non-jumbo and 
jumbo) is at least three to assure that we have a reasonable estimate of the acceptance rate for 
each observation.  Balance sheet liquidity, loan liquidity, and the cost of holding deposits, our 
main variables of interest, are defined above.  Each of these variables comes from the fourth-
quarter Call Report for the year before the loan application.  We use prior-year bank data to 
reduce any mechanical relationship between our dependent variable and the bank characteristics. 
The first three specifications of Table 4 focus on balance-sheet liquidity, deposit cost, and 
loan liquidity individually (columns 1-3).  Then, we report one specification with all three 
variables together (column 4).  Last, we report a full specification with all three variables of 
interest plus the full set of control variables (column 5).  All five specifications suggest that 
banks with more balance sheet liquidity and banks with lower cost of deposits supply more credit 
to the illiquid sector (non-jumbos) relative to the liquid sector (jumbos).  The effects are robust 
across specifications.  This robustness suggests that omitted risk factors, such as the loan-to-
value ratio, are not biasing our key findings.   
The coefficients are not only statistically significant but also economically important.  
For example, if we raise the balance sheet liquidity variable from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of  
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its distribution (an increase of 17.5 percent of assets), the difference between the acceptance rate 
of non-jumbo mortgages and jumbo mortgages falls by 0.4 percentage points.  This change 
represents about 6 percent of the variation in the dependent variable (based on the inter-quartile 
range of 6.9 percentage points).  For deposits, a move from the 25
th to 75
th percentile in the 
distribution of yields (and increase of 1.1 percentage points) is associated with a relative increase 
in the acceptance rate for non-jumbo mortgages of about 0.5 percentage points.  So, if we 
compare two banks, one with low liquidity and expensive deposits and the other flush with 
liquidity and cheap deposits, the first bank’s acceptance rate for jumbo mortgages would be 
about one percentage point lower than the second. 
The effect of bank size in Table 4 is also notable, and further confirms our overall 
findings.  Log of bank assets enters the regression with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient.  An increase in assets from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile comes with an increase in 
the relative acceptance rate for jumbo mortgages of 0.6 percentage points, comparable to the 
magnitude of the effects of both the cost of deposits and the balance-sheet liquidity ratio.  Thus, 
larger banks are, all else equal, more likely than smaller banks to approve jumbo mortgages 
relative to non-jumbo mortgages.  Because there are many differences in the operating and 
financial policies of large and small banks, we include size mainly as a control variable.  But this 
result may reflect in part large banks’ better access to alternative sources of funds, as well as 
their greater ability to manage liquidity risk.  For example, large banks have a greater ability to 
borrow in the Fed Funds market than smaller banks.
19  Similarly, with better ability to borrow in 
capital markets, large banks are also less reliant on deposits as a marginal source of funds for 
their lending.  
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B. Endogenous Loan-Application Size 
As we noted above, loan-application size itself may be determined (or affected) by banks’ 
ability to securitize or sell off mortgages near the jumbo-loan cutoff.  This notion seems 
consistent with the flow of applications that spikes upward for loans just below the cutoff.  We 
do not observe exactly how a bank might influence its applicants, although it seems likely that 
influence could be accomplished with carrots (‘lower interest rates below the cutoff…’) or sticks 
(‘the loan will only be accepted if it comes in below the cutoff…’). 
To test whether the pool of loans around the jumbo-loan cutoff is endogenous to bank 
financial condition, we construct the share of non-jumbo loans (95 percent to 100 percent of the 
cutoff) in all applications near the cutoff (95 percent to 105 percent of the cutoff), irrespective of 
whether or not the loan is accepted.  We then relate this measure to bank financial conditions, as 
follows: 
Non-jumbo applications within 5% of jumbo cutoff / All applications within 5% of cutoffi,t = 
= β1Balance-sheet liquidityi,t-1 + β2Deposit costi,t-1 + β3Loan liquidityi,t-1     (2) 
+ Control Variablesi,t + εi,t. . 
The dependent variable indicates the extent to which a given bank may encourage 
marginal applicants to apply for a mortgage just below the cutoff, as a function of the bank’s 
funding and liquidity.  If more constrained banks create more high-powered incentive for 
applicants to reduce their demand (e.g. with a larger jumbo/non-jumbo pricing differential), then 
we would expect constrained banks to receive a larger share of non-jumbo applications.  Thus, 
we expect β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.  We use the same set of bank and loan-pool control variables 
included in our model of the differential probability.  As before, the unit of observation is the  
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bank-year, but we now include all banks with at least one loan applications of each type around 
the jumbo-loan cutoff (i.e. within 5 percent).  And, we continue to include state and year 
indicators, and to cluster the residual at the bank level in constructing standard errors. 
Table 5 reports the results, with the same set of five specifications reported earlier.  As 
before, balance sheet liquidity and funding costs are significantly related to the flow of loan 
applications.  The applicant flow is skewed toward the relatively liquid mortgages (those below 
the cutoff) for banks with lower levels of balance sheet liquidity or higher cost of deposits.  
Banks that have less liquidity or higher deposit costs seem more likely to push applicants below 
the jumbo-loan cutoff.  This is consistent with the notion that more liquid banks and banks with 
cheaper deposits are better financially positioned to originate illiquid loans and hence are less 
likely to affect the flow of mortgage applications.  These effects across specifications are robust 
in the statistical sense, although the coefficient on deposit cost declines when we add the full set 
of control variables (column 5).  In terms of the coefficient magnitudes, the effect of liquidity is 
notable.  A move from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile in the liquid-assets distribution is associated 
with an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the share of jumbo loans.  This increase represents a 
10 percent rise relative to the mean share of jumbo-loan applications (only 18 percent of the 
mortgages near the jumbo-loan cutoff fall above that level). 
In addition, we find that both bank size and the capital-asset ratio strongly affect the flow 
of applications.  Larger banks receive a larger share of non-jumbo loans.  And, in contrast to the 
relative acceptance rates, where bank capital was not significant, the share of non-jumbo loan 
applications declines with bank capital.  Well-capitalized banks seem less likely to push 
borrowers below the jumbo-loan threshold, perhaps indicating their willingness to originate and 
hold (jumbo) mortgages.  
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C. Applicant-Pool Endogeneity and Acceptance Rates 
The strong link between the applicant flows around the jumbo-loan cutoff and bank’s 
funding and liquidity suggests that the effects of financial conditions on acceptance rates 
estimated in Table 4 may be understated.  As shown earlier in Figure 4, the overall differential 
acceptance rate is biased upward (the acceptance rate spikes up just below the cutoff).  The high 
acceptance rate just below the cutoff probably reflects high-wealth applicants’ ability to reduce 
their borrowing relative to applicants with less wealth.  The better the quality of applicants 
shifting below the cutoff, the larger is the bias.  The financially unconstrained banks are likely to 
provide the weakest pricing incentive for applicants to borrow below the cutoff, leading only the 
highest wealth applicants to shift.  In contrast, the constrained banks are likely to provide 
stronger incentives, leading lower quality applicants to shift as well.  Thus, the bias should be 
largest for the unconstrained banks.
20   
To test this notion, we re-estimate the differential acceptance rate regressions, dropping 
loan applications within 5 percent of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  These results are reported in 
Table 6.  As expected, the coefficients on the financial variables are larger in magnitude and 
have higher levels of statistical significance than those reported in Table 4.
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D.  Sorting of Borrowers across Banks 
Beyond the endogeneity of applicant size, the whole distribution of loan applications 
across banks may shift in response to the relative pricing of non-jumbos.  Funding-constrained 
banks presumably price jumbos at higher relative rates than unconstrained banks (remember that 
we are unable to observe loan prices).  Sorting of borrowers across banks is facilitated by 
mortgage brokers and internet companies that lower the cost of search relative to potential 
savings from small changes in prices.  To the extent that most jumbo-loan borrowers avoid  
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applying to funding constrained banks at all, it will be harder to observe differences in 
acceptance rates because the most constrained banks may price themselves out of the jumbo 
market entirely.  Or, said slightly differently, the most constrained banks with the highest 
rejection rates for jumbo loans will not be observed in our data (because they receive no 
applications). 
To test for sorting effects, we regress the overall share of non-jumbo applications 
(between 50 and 250 percent of the cutoff) on the same set of financing variables, loan-pool 
characteristics and bank characteristics (Table 7).  Since we are interested in borrower’s choice 
of bank, we drop the marginal loan applications (those within five percent of the jumbo-loan 
cutoff), where the size of loan itself may be endogenous.  In these specifications, we include all 
banks that receive at least 3 applications in the 50 to 250 percent interval.  We find, again, that 
financially constrained banks receive a significantly lower share of jumbo-loan applications, 
although the coefficients are smaller in magnitude than those that we estimate for the marginal 
loan applicants (i.e. those near the cutoff).  A move from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile in the 
liquid-assets distribution, for example, is associated with an increase of about 1.2 percentage 
points in the share of jumbo loans.  So, the pool of applications shifts toward more liquid loans 
as the originating banks become more financially constrained. 
E. Separating the Financial Effects on Non-jumbo and Jumbo Mortgages 
The results so far are limited in that we have estimated how a bank’s liquidity or funding 
costs affect its supply of jumbo mortgages relative to non-jumbo mortgages.  As noted, this 
approach is conservative because it allows us to difference out demand-side forces that might 
bias the relationship between bank characteristics and loan supply.  However, the cost is that we 
are not able to identify the direct effects of the financial variables on mortgage acceptance rates.   
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To estimate a model that separates the effects of funding and liquidity on non-jumbo mortgages 
from its effect on jumbos, we separate the acceptance rate for jumbos and non-jumbo mortgages 
and relate each to the balance sheet liquidity, loan liquidity and the cost of holding deposits.  
This approach essentially boils down to estimating equations (1a) and (1b) above as a 
system of seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner, 1962).  Thus, we now analyze two 
acceptance rates for each bank-year: one for the non-jumbo mortgages, and one for the jumbos.  
We include a jumbo-loan indicator and its interaction with bank funding and liquidity 
characteristics (as well as every other variable), allowing us to disentangle how bank 
characteristics affect the acceptance rates for both types of loans.  In this expanded model, the 
unobservable demand-side variables are no longer differenced out, but will only (potentially) 
bias the direct effects of liquidity and funding costs on the acceptance rate.  The approach is 
more comprehensive because it allows us to consider significantly more bank-years in our 
analysis since we do not impose a condition that a bank should have at least three loan 
applications in both confirming and jumbo-loan categories. 
Table 8 reports these results.  As before, we estimate simple specifications that focus only 
on the variables of greatest interest, and then we report multi-variate specifications with the full 
set of control variables.  In Panel A, we report the results for the full sample of loans, and in 
Panel B we again drop applications in which loan-application size is potentially endogenous (i.e. 
observations that are within 5 percent of the jumbo-loan cutoff).  The interaction terms of 
balance sheet liquidity and cost of deposits with the jumbo-loan dummy have the same 
interpretation as the coefficients in Table 4 and Table 6.  Even though we have dramatically 
increased the sample, the magnitudes of these coefficients are similar to those reported earlier.  
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The coefficients suggest that neither balance sheet liquidity nor deposit yields are 
correlated with the acceptance rate for non-jumbo mortgages.  Since banks don’t need to hold 
these loans on their balance sheet, the acceptance rate is not affected by the bank’s cost of 
deposits or liquidity.  If a bank chooses to hold a non-jumbo mortgage, then its overall liquidity 
does not affect this decision because it could, at relatively low cost, remove the loan by selling it 
into the secondary market.  In contrast, the loan liquidity measure, which again is driven in large 
part by the depth of the securitization market as a whole, is very strongly related to the 
acceptance rate for both kinds of mortgages.  Moreover, its effect is greater for the non-jumbo 
loans.  This result seems sensible because it reflects the increasing relative advantage of holding 
the non-jumbo loans as the depth of this market has increased over time.  Finally, the results 
once again confirm that higher liquidity and lower costs of deposits positively affect a bank’s 
willingness to supply illiquid loans. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional banks originated illiquid loans and funded them with liquid deposits.  As a 
result, a decline in deposit supply (such as one following a monetary policy tightening) reduced 
loan supply.  Banks also needed to hold enough cash to satisfy random demands for liquidity 
from depositors.  Securitization is changing the model of banking from one of ‘originate and 
hold’ to one of ‘originate and sell’, thereby mitigating the effects of both deposit supply and 
balance sheet liquidity on loan supply.  As evidence, we show that a bank’s willingness to 
approve jumbo mortgages (an example of illiquid loans) depends on both its cost of deposits and 
its holdings of liquid assets.  In contrast, financial condition has no effect on acceptance rates for 
non-jumbo loans.  Given the rapid expansion of loan securitization (as well as the growth of loan  
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sales and syndication), the results suggest that access to capital is less subject to variations in the 
supply of local deposits to banks than in the past.  The expansion of the secondary market in 
mortgages has also likely dampened the effects of monetary policy on real economic activity by 
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Figure 2 
Securitization of Loans in the US Economy 
 
The Figure presents the percentage of loans securitized relative to total loans outstanding for six categories of loans: (i) home mortgages, (ii) multifamily residential mortgages, 
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Figure 3: Jumbo/Non-Jumbo Spread Controlling for Credit Risk 
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Full Smaple Our Sample
 1976 1986 1996 2003
Single-Family Mortgages
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $489 $1,554 $3,533 $7,283
Securitized Loans (Billions) $28 $411 $1,806 $4,223
Securitized Share 5.7% 26.4% 51.1% 58.0%
Multi-Family Residential Mortgages
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $101 $212 $268 $504
Securitized Loans (Billions) $1 $9 $40 $175
Securitized Share 1.0% 4.2% 14.9% 34.7%
Commercial Mortgages
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $162 $553 $729 $1,452
Securitized Loans (Billions) $0 $1 $45 $294
Securitized Share 0.0% 0.3% 6.2% 20.2%
Farm Mortgages
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $51 $104 $85 $132
Securitized Loans (Billions) $2 $0 $0 $0
Securitized Share 3.9% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Commercial & Industrial Loans
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $409 $1,192 $1,674 $2,194
Securitized Loans (Billions) $0 $0 $30 $104
Securitized Share 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 4.7%
Consumer Loans
Loans Outstanding (Billions) $205 $607 $1,163 $2,040
Securitized Loans (Billions) $0 $0 $226 $658
Securitized Share 0.0% 0.0% 19.4% 32.3%
This table presents economy-wide loans outstanding and securitized.  Data are from the U.S. Flow of Funds.
Table 1:  Loans Outstanding and SecuritizationFull Selected Years:
Sample 1992 1998 2003
Number of Loan Applications 6,143,057 314,927 526,356 354,992
Probability of Acceptance (%) 90.85 87.13 92.36 90.28
Average Loan Amount (thousands) $209 $174 $191 $282
Average Applicant Income (thousands / year) $120 $101 $117 $142
Average Area Income (thousands / year) $51 $53 $49 $70
Average Loan-to-Income Ratio 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.8
Percent Minority 14.14 14.60 10.09 18.68
Percent of Minority Population in the Area 14.83 15.92 11.63 24.12
Percent Female 15.02 12.05 13.92 19.49
Percent of Loans in MSA 91.84 97.51 89.10 89.83
Jumbo-Loan Cutoff (thousands) $202 $227 $323
This table contains summary statistics for the sample of mortgages used in the regressions reported in 
Tables 4-6.  Figures are based on a sample of conventional home mortgage applications to commercial 
banks, from the HMDA data collected by the Federal Reserve Board.  The mortgage applications are for 
loans between 50% and 250% of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  The jumbo-loan cutoff is 50% higher in Alaska 
and Hawaii than in the other states.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Mortgage Applications Characteristics25th 75th 25th  75th
Percentile Median Percentile Percentile Median Percentile
Total Assets (millions of $s) 42.6 84.4 194.1 17.4 32.5 62.9
Financial Struture & Liquidity (%)
Liquid Assets / Assets 19.9 27.8 37.4 22.9 32.7 43.9
Loan Liquidity 16.9 22.8 30.1 13.1 19.6 26.8
Cost of Deposits 2.7 3.3 3.9 2.7 3.5 4.1
Capital / Assets 7.4 8.5 10.1 8.0 9.4 11.6
Loan Shares (% of assets)
Total Loans 53.9 63.3 71.1 47.0 58.1 67.4
Commercial & Industrial Loans 9.7 17.6 27.4 14.4 25.7 41.4
Home Mortgages 20.2 31.2 46.3 14.3 25.2 37.8
 Commercial Mortgages 10.7 18.1 26.9 4.9 10.7 19.4
 Consumer Loans 4.9 9.9 17.5 7.6 12.8 20.4
Profit (%)
Net Income / Assets 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.7 1.1 1.4
Mortgage application
Number of loan applications 6 16 54 n/a n/a n/a
Number of loans Issued 5 15 50 n/a n/a n/a
Probability of Acceptance (%) 88.9 96.5 99.0 n/a n/a n/a
Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Bank Characteristics
Panel A: Banks Included in Our Sample Panel B: Excluded Banks
This table reports information on the distribution of characteristics for banks that we matched to the mortgage application data, and for 
banks that we exclude from our analysis.  Liquid assets equals cash plus marketable securities.  The cost of deposits equals interest 
expense on deposits to total deposits.  Loan liquidity is a measure of the ability of a bank to sell its loans into the secondary market (see 
text for details).Dependent Variable Differential Acceptance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -2.65 -2.534 -2.345
(2.88)*** (2.78)*** (2.58)**
Loan Liquidity 4.473 3.742 1.791
(3.55)*** (2.87)*** (1.97)**
Cost of Deposits 57.133 43.242 42.392
(3.56)*** (2.62)*** (2.62)***
Other Bank Controls
Log of Bank Assets -0.322
(3.93)***
Capital / Assets 0.241
(0.07)
Net Income / Assets -7.559
(0.46)
Loan-Pool Characteristics
MSA share - Jumbos 2.27
(2.17)**
MSA share - Non-Jumbos -1.072
(0.99)
Local area Percent Minority Population - Jumbos 0.043
(1.67)*
Local area Percent Minority Population - Non-Jumbos -0.004
(0.15)
Loan-to-Income Ratio - Jumbos 0.488
(4.74)***
Loan-to-Income Ratio - Non-Jumbo -0.502
(2.21)**
Log of Applicant Income - Jumbos -0.004
(4.82)***
Log of Applicant Income - Non-Jumbos 0.004
(3.76)***
Local area median income - Jumbos -0.039
(2.73)***
Local area median income - Non-Jumbos 0.072
(3.27)***
Share minority applicants - Jumbos 5.156
(4.24)***
Share minority applicants - Non-Jumbos -6.522
(4.29)***
Share Female applicants - Jumbos 2.693
(2.40)**
Share Female applicants - Non-Jumbos -0.988
(0.65)
Observations 14,787 14,787 14,787 14,787 14,787
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Regressions Analysis of Relative Acceptance Rates 
for Jumbo and Non-Jumbo Mortgages
This table reports regressions of the acceptance rate of non-jumbo mortgages minus the acceptance rate for jumbos for 
bank-year observations from 1992 to 2003.  Columns 1-4 report simple specifications with only bank-level financial 
variables; column 5 reports specifications with the full set of control variables.  The acceptance rates are based on 
mortgages between 50% and 250% of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  We only include a bank-year observation if the bank 
received at least 3 applications of each type.  All regressions also include year and state indicators.Dependent Variable Non-Jumbo Applications / Total Applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -0.11 -0.111 -0.100
(5.05)*** (5.09)*** (4.59)***
Loan Liquidity 0.102 0.072 0.076
(3.16)*** (2.21)** (2.34)**
Cost of Deposits 1.158 1.012 0.628
(3.49)*** (3.05)*** (1.95)*
Other Bank Controls
Log of Bank Assets 0.025
(13.36)***
Capital / Assets -0.35
(3.87)***
Net Income / Assets -0.23
(0.64)
Loan-Pool Characteristics
MSA share  -0.097
(4.85)***




Log of Applicant Income -0.003
(1.47)
Local area median income 0.107
(10.13)***
Share minority applicants  -0.017
(1.01)
Share Female applicants -0.019
(1.24)
Observations 7,303 7,303 7,303 7,303 7,158
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.18
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Regression Analysis of the Share of Non-jumbo Mortgage Applications 
within 5% of the Jumbo-Loan Cutoff
This table reports regressions of the share of non-jumbo mortgages applications within 5% of the jumbo-loan cutoff for 
bank-year observations from 1992 to 2003.  Columns 1-4 report simple specifications with only bank-level financial 
variables; column 5 reports specifications with the full set of control variables.  We only include a bank-year observation 
if the bank received at least one applications of each type.  All regressions also include year and state indicators.Dependent Variable Differential Acceptance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -3.104 -2.974 -2.886
(3.22)*** (3.12)*** (3.00)***
Loan Liquidity 4.805 3.95 1.574
(3.70)*** (2.93)*** (2.01)**
Cost of Deposits 65.737 51.134 49.654
(3.97)*** (2.99)*** (2.95)***
Other Bank Controls
Log of Bank Assets -0.306
(3.54)***
Capital / Assets 0.116
(0.03)
Net Income / Assets -6.937
(0.42)
Loan Pool Characteristics
MSA share - Jumbos -1.45
(1.23)
MSA share - Non-Jumbos 0.736
(0.60)
Local area Percent Minority Population - Jumbos -0.019
(0.69)
Local area Percent Minority Population - Non-Jumbos 0.053
(1.87)*
Loan-to-Income Ratio - Jumbos 0.444
(4.51)***
Loan-to-Income Ratio - Non-Jumbo -0.647
(4.14)***
Log of Applicant Income - Jumbos -0.005
(5.22)***
Log of Applicant Income - Non-Jumbos 0.004
(3.80)***
Local area median income - Jumbos -0.098
(6.79)***
Local area median income - Non-Jumbos 0.136
(5.87)***
Share minority applicants - Jumbos 5.515
(4.42)***
Share minority applicants - Non-Jumbos -6.603
(4.08)***
Share Female applicants - Jumbos 2.817
(2.47)**
Share Female applicants - Non-Jumbos -0.71
(0.46)
Observations 14,428 14,428 14,428 14,428 14,137
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Regression Analysis of Relative Acceptance Rates for Jumbo and Non-Jumbo Mortgages
Without Mortgages within 5% of Jumbo-Loan Cutoff
This table reports regressions of the acceptance rate of non-jumbo mortgages minus the acceptance rate for jumbos for bank-
year observations from 1992 to 2003.  Columns 1-4 report simple specifications with only bank-level financial variables; 
column 5 reports specifications with the full set of control variables.  The acceptance rates are based on mortgages between 
50% and 250% of the jumbo-loan cutoff, without mortgages within 5% of the cutoff.  We only include a bank-year observation
if the bank received at least 3 applications of each type.  All regressions also include year and state indicators.Dependent Variable Non-Jumbo Applications / Total Applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -0.070 -0.074 -0.068
(4.69)*** (4.94)*** (5.06)***
Loan Liquidity 0.270 0.257 0.242
(11.38)*** (10.34)*** (10.55)***
Cost of Deposits 1.790 1.084 0.564
(8.42)*** (5.01)*** (2.92)***
Other Bank Controls
Log of Bank Assets 0.013
(8.36)***
Capital / Assets -0.203
(3.40)***
Net Income / Assets 0.344
(1.82)*
Loan-Pool Characteristics Included
Observations 27,539 27,539 27,539 27,539 27,148
R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.12 0.3
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table reports regressions of the share of non-jumbo mortgages applications between 50 and 250% of the jumbo-loan 
cutoff, exlcuding those within 5% of the cutoff, for bank-year observations from 1992 to 2003.  Columns 1-4 report 
simple specifications with only bank-level financial variables; column 5 reports specifications with the full set of control 
variables.  All regressions also include year and state indicators.
Table 7: Regression Analysis of the Share of Non-jumbo Mortgage Applications
50%-95% and 105%-250% of Jumbo-Loan Cutoff
-Dependent Variable Mortgage Acceptance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jumbo Indicator 12.54 14.543 16.046 16.877
(4.18)*** (4.82)*** (5.07)*** (5.33)***
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -1.383 (1.18) -1.492
(1.54) -1.33 (1.68)*
Jumbo * Liquid Assets / Assets 2.871 2.57 2.633
(2.68)*** (2.41)** (2.47)**
Loan Liquidity 7.854 7.71
(5.86)*** (5.83)***
Jumbo * Loan Liquidity -5.322 -4.814
(4.24)*** (3.83)***
Cost of Deposits 35.074 20.728
(2.20)** (1.31)
Jumbo * Cost of Deposits -54.526 -50.11
(3.93)*** (3.60)***
Other Bank Controls        Included, coefficients not reported
Conforming Loan-Pool Characteristics         Included, coefficients not reported
Jumbo Loan-Pool Characteristics
Observations 55,994 55,994 55,994 55,994
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Regression Analysis of Acceptance Rates for Jumbo and Non-jumbo Mortgages
Panel A: Loan Applications in 50 to 250% of Jumbo-Loan Cutoff
This table reports regressions of the acceptance rate of mortgages for both jumbo and non-jumbo mortgages 
for bank-year observations from 1992 to 2003 (i.e. there are 2 observations per bank-year).  The acceptance 
rates are based on mortgages between 50% and 250% of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  We only include a bank-
year-loan observation if the bank received at least 3 applications.  All regressions also include year and state 
indicators.  We include all of the other bank & loan-pool characteristics that appear in Tables 4-6, and we 
allow the coefficients to vary between the jumbo and non-jumbo acceptance rates.  These coefficients are 
not reported here to save space.Dependent Variable Mortgage Acceptance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jumbo Indicator 11.148 13.124 15.764 16.003
(3.57)*** (4.18)*** (4.77)*** (4.85)***
Bank Financial Condition
Liquid Assets / Assets -1.369 -1.439
(1.50) (1.59)
Jumbo * Liquid Assets / Assets 2.467 2.209
(2.24)** (2.02)**
Loan Liquidity 7.753 7.539
(5.75)*** (5.67)***
Jumbo * Loan Liquidity -5.701 -5.134
(4.44)*** (3.99)***
Cost of Deposits 41.211 25.893
(1.59) (1.64)
Jumbo * Cost of Deposits -62.691 -55.763
(4.41)*** (3.93)***
Other Bank Controls        Included, coefficients not reported
Conforming Loan-Pool Characteristics
Jumbo Loan-Pool Characteristics
Observations 54,523 54,523 54,523 54,523
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
T-statistics in parentheses, based on errors clustered at the bank level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
        Included, coefficients not reported
Table 8: Regression Analysis of Acceptance Rates for Jumbo and Non-jumbo Mortgages
Panel B: Loan Applications in 50-95% and 105-250% of Jumbo-Loan Cutoff
This table reports regressions of the acceptance rate of mortgages for both jumbo and non-jumbo mortgages 
for bank-year observations from 1992 to 2003 (i.e. there are 2 observations per bank-year).  The acceptance 
rates are based on mortgages between 50-95% and 105-250% of the jumbo-loan cutoff.  We only include a 
bank-year-loan observation if the bank received at least 3 applications.  All regressions also include year 
and state indicators.  We include all of the other bank & loan-pool characteristics that appear in Tables 4-6, 
and we allow the coefficients to vary between the jumbo and non-jumbo acceptance rates.  These 
coefficients are not reported here to save space. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Endnotes 
1 In recent years, the GSEs have opted to hold rather than securitize many of the mortgages that they buy to take 
advantage of subsidized borrowing rates.  Policymakers have become concerned about the resulting expansion of 
interest rate risk at the GSEs (Greenspan, 2004).  As of 2003, for example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held over 
$1.5 trillion in mortgages (Frame and White, 2005).  Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) argue that most (but 
not all) of the benefits of GSE subsidized borrowing benefits their shareholders rather than mortgage borrowers.   
Vickery (2005) shows that  GSE subsidies are concentrated in the fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) segment rather than 
the adjustable-rate mortgage segment, explaining why FRMs dominate in the U.S. relative to the U.K.  While the 
effects of this government subsidy are important for public policy, they are not the focus here. 
2 Benmelech, Germaise and Moskowitz (2005) use a similar identification strategy to analyze how real-asset 
liquidity (as opposed to financial-asset liquidity here) affects debt capacity.  In their case, they exploit differences in 
the liquidity of commercial properties stemming from variation in zoning restrictions. 
3 We are only able to identify which mortgages are jumbo in our data, and hence can not be sold to the GSEs.  For 
loans below the jumbo-loan cutoff, most can be sold to the GSEs (i.e. most are ‘conforming’ mortgages).  However, 
some non-jumbo loans do not meet the other criteria used to determine whether a mortgage is conforming, such as 
the loan-to-value ratio.  Thus, there is some measurement error in our classification of loans as conforming. 
 
4  Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) present a theoretical analysis showing how real shocks can be exacerbated by 
reductions in credit supply.  Bernanke (1983) first showed that shocks to finance can have empirically significant 
effects on the magnitude of business downturns, focusing on the U.S. Great Depression.  More recent research has 
focused on regional downturns, and most studies find that such shocks are amplified by their effects on local banks 
(e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991), Ashcraft (2005), Becker (2005)). 
5  Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that banks flush with balance-sheet liquidity respond less to monetary tightening 
because such banks can continue originating loans in the face of increased funding costs by running down their 
stock of liquid assets.  Their findings complement ours, because we find that the supply of liquid loans does not 
respond to banks’ cost of funds. 
6 For evidence that bank size and scope reduces the potency of monetary policy, see Ashcraft (2003), 
Campello (2002), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), and Loutskina (2005). 
7 Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that small firms benefit by concentrating their business with a single lender, and 
their results suggest that such borrowers face high costs of switching banks.  Thus, many small firms are ‘bank 
dependent’.  The geographical scope of loan markets, particularly for bank dependent firms, tends to be limited 
geographically because local lenders have better information than competing lenders.  Technology has increased the 
average distance between small-business borrowers and lenders, but physical proximity continues to affect bank 
lending supply and pricing (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005).  Our results suggest that bank 
dependent firms’ cost of capital depends on the financial condition (cost of deposits and liquidity) of local lenders.  
8 Bernanke (1983) focused on credit effects of bank failures during the Depression.  More recently, Bernanke and 
Lown (1991) show that credit in regions with many poorly capitalized banks suffered most during the 1991-92 
recession.   Peek and Rosengren (2000) show that distressed Japanese banks reduced credit supply to borrowers in 
California (relative to California banks).  Ashcraft (2005) shows that local output falls when the FDIC closes even 
healthy banks.  Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) provide evidence that borrowers from Continental Illinois 
were potentially harmed by that bank’s failure.  Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) show that low capital banks price 
business loans at higher yields than better-capitalized banks.  Like our paper, Mian and Khwaja (2005) and 
Paravisini (2004) focus on how liquidity shifts loan supply.  Mian and Khwaja exploit bank runs following 
Pakistan’s unexpected nuclear test in 1998; they show that firms borrowed less from banks experiencing greater runs 
and more from banks experiencing smaller runs.  Paravisini finds that profitable lending expands following an 
infusion of liquidity by the Argentine government into banks.   
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Gorton and Souleles (2005) argue that this process reduces financial distress costs of debt. 
10 We have also disaggregated our liquidity measure by separating out mortgage-backed securities from other liquid 
assets.  In these robustness tests, there is no additional effect of mortgage-backed securities, suggesting that our 
coefficient represent shifts in bank behavior in response to variation in liquidity.  We thank Scott Frame for 
suggesting this test to us. 
 
11 See http://www.fanniemae.com. 
 
12  The extent to which the yield differentials reflects liquidity, rather than differences in credit risk, between non-
jumbo mortgages and jumbos remains somewhat controversial.  A recent study by Ambrose, LaCour-Little and 
Sanders (2004) controls carefully for credit risk and concludes that the yield differential is only about 5 basis points 
between non-jumbo and jumbo mortgages.  Nevertheless, there seems to be little doubt that there is an increase in 
yields for jumbos, and that some of that increase reflects differences in liquidity. 
 
13 Here we consider only single-family home purchase mortgage applications across the lending financial 
institutions in the United States. 
14 Note that the difference between average census tract income ($51 thousand) and the average applicant income 
($208 thousand) in our sample is due to the fact that we only consider mortgages between 50 percent and 250 
percent of the jumbo-loan cutoff. 
15 Our results are not sensitive to this assumption.  For example, we have also estimated our models for loans 
between 75 percent and 150 percent of the jumbo-loan threshold and find similar results to those reported here.  
These results are available on request from the authors. 
16 We are not able to observe the fraction of on-balance sheet mortgages that are below the jumbo-loan cutoff. 
17  We have also estimated a more parsimonious approach, in which we control for average bank-specific loan pool 
characteristics, and obtain results that are very similar to those reported here. 
18 We have also estimated standard errors clustered by state and clustered by year.  We find similar levels of 
statistical significance in each of these alternative approaches to those reported here. 
 
19 Large banks typically borrow in this market, whereas smaller banks typically supply funds to the Fed Funds 
market. 
20 Note that some borrowers may split their borrowing into a non-jumbo loan plus a small subordinated second 
mortgage to take advantage of the jumbo/non-jumbo pricing differential.  Wealthier applicants will be more able to 
exploit this possibility. 
 
21 The statistical significance of these results increases when we estimate the model on the logistic transformation of 
the non-jumbo share. 